美國(guó)聯(lián)邦巡回法院擴(kuò)大通用性商標(biāo)名稱測(cè)試后，飲料巨頭對(duì)“零度”商標(biāo)之爭(zhēng)發(fā)回TTAB重新審理

#本文僅代表作者觀點(diǎn)，文章不代表IPRdaily立場(chǎng)#

發(fā)布：IPRdaily中文網(wǎng)（IPRdaily.cn）

作者：Jeffery A. Handelman 律師 及Virginia Wolk Marino律師

供稿：Brinks Gilson & Lione律師事務(wù)所

原標(biāo)題：美國(guó)聯(lián)邦巡回法院擴(kuò)大通用性商標(biāo)名稱測(cè)試后，飲料巨頭對(duì)“零度”商標(biāo)之爭(zhēng)發(fā)回TTAB重新審理

本文案件中，飲料巨頭Coca-Cola Co. 欲將“零度（Zero）”名稱作為其品牌一部分進(jìn)行專有注冊(cè)，TTAB認(rèn)為“零度（Zero）”名稱不屬于通用性商標(biāo)，但在競(jìng)爭(zhēng)對(duì)手上訴后，聯(lián)邦巡回法院基于三點(diǎn)原因認(rèn)為TTAB運(yùn)用了不正確的法律標(biāo)準(zhǔn)并將該案發(fā)回TTAB重新審理：第一、TTAB在調(diào)查名稱的通用性時(shí)提出錯(cuò)誤問(wèn)題；第二、TTAB未能評(píng)估名稱描述性的程度；第三、TTAB未能采用嚴(yán)格角度審核證據(jù)。

一家公司是否可以擁有對(duì)無(wú)卡路里軟飲料使用“零度（Zero）”名稱的排他權(quán)？美國(guó)聯(lián)邦巡回上訴法院將該問(wèn)題發(fā)回至商標(biāo)審理與上訴委員會(huì)（Trademark Trial and Appeal Board ，“TTAB”）重審，法院認(rèn)為TTAB在最初解決該問(wèn)題時(shí)既使用了錯(cuò)誤的法律框架。

Coca-Cola Co.（簡(jiǎn)稱“Coca-Cola”）欲將“零度（Zero）”名稱作為其品牌一部分進(jìn)行注冊(cè)，由此引起Royal Crown Company, Inc. 和 Dr Pepper/Seven Up, Inc. (簡(jiǎn)稱“Royal Crown”) 產(chǎn)生與其就該注冊(cè)名稱長(zhǎng)達(dá)十幾年之久的爭(zhēng)議。Royal Crown與Coca-Cola均在飲料市場(chǎng)中競(jìng)爭(zhēng)，并且雙方都使用“零度（Zero）”名稱與旗下多種飲料產(chǎn)品聯(lián)系在一起。例如，Royal Crown使用DIET RITE PURE ZERO與其商標(biāo)聯(lián)系；Coca-Cola使用COCA-COLA ZERO 和SPRITE ZERO與其商標(biāo)聯(lián)系。在實(shí)踐中，兩家公司的商標(biāo)均與最低或無(wú)卡路里飲料一起使用。倆家公司均對(duì)各自的“零度（Zero）”品牌飲料產(chǎn)品遞交了美國(guó)聯(lián)邦商標(biāo)申請(qǐng)。Royal Crown在申請(qǐng)中放棄對(duì)“零度（Zero）”名稱的權(quán)利（注：簽署免責(zé)聲明并不意味著移除標(biāo)記中的主題，而僅是商標(biāo)權(quán)人對(duì)這一主題不主張擁有排他權(quán)的聲明。）Coca-Cola在申請(qǐng)中沒(méi)有放棄對(duì)“零度（Zero）”名稱的權(quán)利，相反，其遞交了該名稱獲得顯著性（Distinctiveness）的聲明，并得到USPTO認(rèn)可。

拓展：15 U.S.C.  §1052(f) 商標(biāo)獲得顯著性（Distinctiveness） 或第二含義（ Secondary Meaning）

如申請(qǐng)注冊(cè)的商標(biāo)或服務(wù)標(biāo)識(shí)名稱本身不具有固有顯著性（inherently distinctive），如描述性商標(biāo)（descriptive mark，指僅僅描述了其使用商品的功能、質(zhì)量、成份等特點(diǎn)的商標(biāo)）、地名商標(biāo)（geographic mark）和姓氏商標(biāo)（family names，surname），該類商標(biāo)只有在商標(biāo)權(quán)人證明其商標(biāo)在商業(yè)上已獲得顯著性或第二含義后，方可獲得在主注冊(cè)簿（Principal Register）上的注冊(cè)。

自2007年起，Royal Crown對(duì)Coca-Cola含有“零度（Zero）”構(gòu)詞要素的19項(xiàng)申請(qǐng)?zhí)岢霎愖h（Oppositions），辯稱當(dāng)“零度（Zero）”一詞的使用與Coca-Cola產(chǎn)品相聯(lián)系時(shí)，該詞僅具有描述性（Merely descriptive）或是通用名稱（Generic）。Royal Crown要求Coca-Cola必須放棄該詞的排他權(quán)，整體與Coca-Cola商標(biāo)分離。多項(xiàng)異議被合并后，TTAB對(duì)Royal Crown的異議部分支持部分駁回。相關(guān)部分中，TTAB認(rèn)為Royal Crown并未證實(shí)普通消費(fèi)者在主要使用或理解“零度（Zero）”一詞時(shí)會(huì)聯(lián)系到商品種類中的軟飲料、運(yùn)動(dòng)飲料或能量飲料，反而僅與Coca-Cola的ZERO系列飲料進(jìn)行聯(lián)系，因此這一詞語(yǔ)并非通用名稱。TTAB進(jìn)一步認(rèn)為Coca-Cola證實(shí)了當(dāng)描述性詞匯“零度（Zero）”作為商標(biāo)的一部分用于軟飲料、糖漿、濃縮液和制作軟飲料的粉末時(shí)，該描述性詞匯獲得了顯著性?；诖薚TAB駁回了Royal Crown對(duì)Coca-Cola申請(qǐng)的異議。

上訴中，聯(lián)邦巡回法院撤銷了TTAB的駁回裁決，法院認(rèn)為TTAB在制定“通用性商標(biāo)測(cè)試（Test for genericness）”的構(gòu)架中出現(xiàn)錯(cuò)誤，未能確定Coca-Cola的“零度（Zero）”一詞是否具有高度描述性（Highly descriptive）。特別是，聯(lián)邦巡回法院發(fā)現(xiàn)TTAB在評(píng)估“零度（Zero）”名稱的通用性時(shí)提出了錯(cuò)誤的問(wèn)題，TTAB未能考慮到如果相關(guān)公眾理解一個(gè)詞語(yǔ)指的是某類產(chǎn)品或服務(wù)的關(guān)鍵要素（Key aspect），這個(gè)詞語(yǔ)對(duì)于該種類的產(chǎn)品或服務(wù)可以是通用性名稱。聯(lián)邦巡回法院進(jìn)一步解釋：如果公眾對(duì)“零度（Zero）”一詞的理解是當(dāng)其與指定飲料名稱結(jié)合時(shí)，指一種具有特定特征的子類別（Sub-group）或飲料類型，這足以使該詞成為通用性名稱。法院還提示TTAB沒(méi)有考慮到相關(guān)消費(fèi)者是否會(huì)將“零度（Zero）”一詞視為軟飲料、運(yùn)動(dòng)飲料或能量飲料子類別的通用性名稱。發(fā)回重審中，聯(lián)邦巡回法院指示TTAB檢測(cè)：“零度（Zero）”一詞是否因其指向至少一個(gè)子類別或類型飲料的關(guān)鍵要素而成為通用性名稱。

在評(píng)論聯(lián)邦巡回法院的意見(jiàn)時(shí)，Thomas J. McCarthy教授指出法院可能曲解了“蘭哈姆法案（the Lanham Act）”所定義的通用性測(cè)試。例如，蘭哈姆法案規(guī)定用于決定一項(xiàng)注冊(cè)商標(biāo)是否成為通用性商標(biāo)的測(cè)試為：“對(duì)于相關(guān)公眾而言注冊(cè)商標(biāo)的首要意義（Primary significance）……變成了商品或服務(wù)的通用性名稱或與之相關(guān)的使用”15 U.S.C. § 1064(3)。值得注意的是，蘭哈姆法案并不考慮商標(biāo)是否指向產(chǎn)品或服務(wù)的“關(guān)鍵要素”，法案只是檢測(cè)商標(biāo)的首要意義是否為產(chǎn)品或服務(wù)的通用性名稱。對(duì)通用性商標(biāo)名稱測(cè)試進(jìn)行擴(kuò)大，聯(lián)邦巡回法院顯然模糊了通用性名稱和描述性名稱的界限。如果一項(xiàng)名稱描述了成分、質(zhì)量、性質(zhì)、功能、特征、目的或其使用的產(chǎn)品或服務(wù)，該名稱則被考慮為僅具有描述性，TMEP 1209.01(b)。聯(lián)邦巡回法院對(duì)“零度（Zero）”的通用性測(cè)試，既“指向產(chǎn)品的關(guān)鍵要素”與描述性商標(biāo)測(cè)試中的“描述質(zhì)量/特征等”非常接近。因此，法院這一決定可能造成商標(biāo)權(quán)人及法院更難對(duì)描述性名稱和通用性名稱進(jìn)行區(qū)分。

描述性名稱和通用性名稱間的區(qū)別在商標(biāo)法中至關(guān)重要。一名標(biāo)識(shí)所有人在展示描述性名稱獲得顯著性后是可能獲得商標(biāo)權(quán)的，但通用性名稱無(wú)法獲得顯著性。潛在地?cái)U(kuò)大通用性名稱的目錄，對(duì)于獲得顯著性的描述性名稱而言，聯(lián)邦巡回法院的做法會(huì)對(duì)其商標(biāo)權(quán)造成危害。

聯(lián)邦巡回法院還發(fā)現(xiàn)TTAB在分析“零度（Zero）”一詞的描述性時(shí)出現(xiàn)錯(cuò)誤。雖然TTAB確實(shí)陳述了普遍的觀點(diǎn)，既高度的描述性要求更多實(shí)質(zhì)證明其獲得顯著性，法院指責(zé)TTAB沒(méi)有就“零度（Zero）”一詞的描述程度做出正式調(diào)查，并且沒(méi)有通過(guò)“嚴(yán)格角度（Exacting lens）”來(lái)評(píng)估Coca-Cola的證據(jù)。法院撤銷了TTAB關(guān)于“零度（Zero）”獲得顯著性的裁決，法院解釋TTAB必須對(duì)“名稱的描述程度作出調(diào)查，在“通用性”至“僅具有描述性”的范圍內(nèi)，并且必須解釋是如何評(píng)估證據(jù)記錄以得出結(jié)論的。” 商標(biāo)從業(yè)者在尋求確立高度描述性名稱已獲得顯著性時(shí)，應(yīng)注意聯(lián)邦巡回法院的“嚴(yán)格角度”證據(jù)標(biāo)準(zhǔn)。

附：英文全文

Fight Over ZERO Trademark Remanded Back to Trademark Trial and Appeal Board After Federal Circuit Broadens Test for Generic Trademarks

Should one company have exclusive rights to use the term “Zero” in connection with no-calorie soft drinks?  The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (“Federal Circuit”) has remanded that question back to the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (“TTAB”), finding that the TTAB erred in its first attempt to resolve that issue.

Royal Crown Company, Inc. and Dr Pepper/Seven Up, Inc. (“Royal Crown”) and The Coca-Cola Co. (“Coca-Cola”) have been involved in a dispute for over a decade concerning Coca-Cola’s attempt to register the term ZERO as part of a brand.  Both Royal Crown and Coca-Cola compete in the beverage market, and both companies use the term ZERO in connection with various beverage products.  For example, Royal Crown uses ZERO in connection with trademarks such as DIET RITE PURE ZERO, while Coca-Cola uses ZERO in connection with trademarks such as COCA-COLA ZERO and SPRITE ZERO.  In practice, both Royal Crown’s and Coca-Cola’s marks are used with minimal or no-calorie drinks.  Both Royal Crown and Coca-Cola filed U.S. federal trademark applications for their respective ZERO brand marks for beverage products.  Royal Crown disclaimed the term ZERO in its applications.  (The entry of a disclaimer does not remove matter from a mark, but is just a statement that the trademark owner does not claim exclusive rights to the matter.)  Coca-Cola did not disclaim ZERO from its applications; rather, it submitted claims of acquired distinctiveness with respect to the term, which were accepted by the U.S. Patent & Trademark Office.

Royal Crown filed oppositions against nineteen of Coca-Cola’s ZERO-formative applications beginning in 2007, arguing that the term ZERO is merely descriptive or generic when used in connection with Coca-Cola’s goods.  In essence, Royal Crown was requesting that Coca-Cola be required to disclaim the term apart from Coca-Cola’s marks as a whole.  The oppositions were consolidated, and the TTAB sustained Royal Crown’s opposition in part and dismissed it in part.  In relevant part, the TTAB found that Royal Crown did not establish that ordinary consumers primarily use or understand the term ZERO to refer to the genus of soft drinks, sports drinks, or energy drinks and, therefore, the term was not generic.  Royal Crown Co., Inc. and Dr Pepper/Seven Up, Inc. v. The Coca-Cola Company, 2016 TTAB LEXIS 234, at *37-39 (TTAB May 23, 2016).  The TTAB further found that Coca-Cola established that the descriptive term ZERO had acquired distinctiveness when used as part of a mark for soft drinks, and for syrups, concentrates, and powders for making soft drinks.  The TTAB dismissed Royal Crown’s oppositions to Coca-Cola’s applications on these bases.  Id. at 48, 50.

On appeal, the Federal Circuit vacated the TTAB’s dismissal, concluding that the TTAB erred in framing the test for genericness and failed to determine whether Coca-Cola’s ZERO marks were highly descriptive.  Royal Crown Co. v. Coca-Cola Co., 892 F.3d 1358, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2018).  Specifically, the Federal Circuit found that the TTAB asked the wrong question in assessing the alleged genericness of the term ZERO, in that it failed to consider that “a term can be generic for a genus of goods or services if the relevant public . . . understands the term to refer to a key aspect of that genus.” Id. at 1367 (quoting In re Cordua Rests., Inc., 823 F.3d 594, 603 (Fed. Cir. 2016)) (emphasis in original).  The Federal Circuit went on to explain that “if the public understands ZERO when used in combination with a designated beverage name to refer to a sub-group or type of beverage that carries specific characteristics, that would be enough to render the term generic.” Id. at 1368.  The Federal Circuit also noted that the TTAB did not take into account whether the relevant consuming public would consider the term ZERO to be generic for a subcategory of soft drinks, sports drinks, or energy drinks.  Id.  In its remand, the Federal Circuit instructed that that the TTAB examine “whether ZERO is generic because it refers to a key aspect of at least a sub-group or type” of the class of beverages.  Id.

In commenting upon the Federal Circuit’s opinion, Professor Thomas J. McCarthy noted that the court may have mischaracterized the test for genericness as defined by the Lanham Act.  See, John L. Welch, Professor McCarthy Critiques the CAFC’s ZERO Decision, THE TTABLOG (June 27, 2018) (http://thettablog.blogspot.com/2018/06/professor-mccarthy-critiques-cafcs-zero.html). For example, the Lanham Act states that the test for determining if a registered mark has become generic is whether “[t]he primary significance of the registered to mark to the relevant public . . . has become the generic name of the goods or services on or in connection with which it has been used.”  15 U.S.C. § 1064(3).  Notably, the Lanham Act test does not consider whether the trademark “refers to a key aspect” of the goods or services, it simply examines whether the mark’s primary significance is the generic name of the goods or services.  By broadening the test for genericness, the Federal Circuit appears to blur the line between generic and descriptive marks.  A mark is considered to be merely descriptive if it describes an ingredient, quality, characteristic, function, feature, purpose, or use of the goods or services with which it is used.  See, e.g., TMEP 1209.01(b) (Oct. 2017).  The Federal Circuit’s genericness test for the term ZERO, namely, whether the term “refers to a key aspect” of the goods comes very close to the “describes a quality/feature/etc.” test for descriptive marks.  As a result, this decision may make it more difficult for trademark owners and courts to distinguish between descriptive and generic terms.

The distinction between descriptive and generic terms is of paramount importance in trademark law.  It is possible for a mark owner to obtain trademark rights in a descriptive mark upon a showing of acquired distinctiveness, while generic terms are incapable of acquiring distinctiveness.  By potentially expanding the category of generic terms, the Federal Circuit may be inadvertently endangering trademark rights in descriptive marks that have acquired distinctiveness.

The Federal Circuit also found that the TTAB erred in its analysis of the descriptiveness of the term ZERO.  While the TTAB did describe the general proposition that higher levels of descriptiveness require a more substantial showing of acquired distinctiveness, the Federal Circuit chided the TTAB for its failure to make a formal finding as to the degree to which the term ZERO is descriptive and its failure to assess Coca-Cola’s evidence through an “exacting lens.” Royal Crown Co., 892 F.3d at 1369.  The Federal Circuit vacated the TTAB’s finding on acquired distinctiveness, explaining that the TTAB must make “an express finding regarding the degree of the mark's descriptiveness on the scale ranging from generic to merely descriptive, and it must explain how its assessment of the evidentiary record reflects that finding.”  Id.  Trademark practitioners should take note of the Federal Circuit’s “exacting lens” evidentiary standard when seeking to establish that a highly descriptive term has acquired distinctiveness.

發(fā)布：IPRdaily中文網(wǎng)（IPRdaily.cn）

作者：Jeffery A. Handelman 律師 及Virginia Wolk Marino律師

供稿：Brinks Gilson & Lione律師事務(wù)所

編輯：IPRdaily趙珍          校對(duì)：IPRdaily縱橫君

“投稿”請(qǐng)投郵箱“iprdaily@163.com”

「關(guān)于IPRdaily」

IPRdaily成立于2014年，是全球影響力的知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)媒體+產(chǎn)業(yè)服務(wù)平臺(tái)，致力于連接全球知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)人，用戶匯聚了中國(guó)、美國(guó)、德國(guó)、俄羅斯、以色列、澳大利亞、新加坡、日本、韓國(guó)等15個(gè)國(guó)家和地區(qū)的高科技公司、成長(zhǎng)型科技企業(yè)IP高管、研發(fā)人員、法務(wù)、政府機(jī)構(gòu)、律所、事務(wù)所、科研院校等全球近50多萬(wàn)產(chǎn)業(yè)用戶（國(guó)內(nèi)25萬(wàn)+海外30萬(wàn)）；同時(shí)擁有近百萬(wàn)條高質(zhì)量的技術(shù)資源+專利資源，通過(guò)媒體構(gòu)建全球知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)資產(chǎn)信息第一入口。2016年獲啟賦資本領(lǐng)投和天使匯跟投的Pre-A輪融資。

（英文官網(wǎng)：iprdaily.com  中文官網(wǎng)：iprdaily.cn） 

本文來(lái)自IPRdaily.cn 中文網(wǎng)并經(jīng)IPRdaily.cn中文網(wǎng)編輯。轉(zhuǎn)載此文章須經(jīng)權(quán)利人同意，并附上出處與作者信息。文章不代表IPRdaily.cn立場(chǎng)，如若轉(zhuǎn)載，請(qǐng)注明出處：“http://m.jupyterflow.com/”