美國近期「專利適格性」的勝訴案件著重于事實(shí)調(diào)查

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發(fā)布：IPRdaily中文網(wǎng)（IPRdaily.cn）

作者：Jacob C. Bachman律師 及 Walter C. Frank律師

供稿：Brinks Gilson & Lione律師事務(wù)所

原標(biāo)題：美國近期“專利適格性”的勝訴案件著重于事實(shí)調(diào)查

本篇文章集合近期美國聯(lián)邦巡回法院對(duì)不適格專利主題的性質(zhì)，因在權(quán)利要求中列述了額外的要素而轉(zhuǎn)化為適格專利主題的案件匯總。聯(lián)邦法院認(rèn)為權(quán)利要求主題只有在加入了一個(gè)超越“易于理解（well-understood）、常規(guī)（routine）、之前被研究員在該領(lǐng)域?qū)嵺`過的傳統(tǒng)活動(dòng)（conventional activity）”才可成為適格專利主題。

在35 U.S.C. § 101規(guī)定下，可授權(quán)專利主題包括“陽光底下一切的人為事物”，暗含不包含自然法則（laws of nature）、自然現(xiàn)象（natural phenomena）及抽象概念（abstract ideas），其均不可申請專利。

在最高法院對(duì)聯(lián)邦法院Alice案判決意見予以肯定后，法院對(duì)不適格專利主題的性質(zhì)是否因在權(quán)利要求中列述了額外的要素而轉(zhuǎn)化為適格專利主題申請進(jìn)行裁決。

權(quán)利要求主題只有在加入了一個(gè)超越“易于理解（well-understood）、常規(guī)（routine）、之前被研究員在該領(lǐng)域?qū)嵺`過的傳統(tǒng)活動(dòng)（conventional activity）”才可成為適格專利主題。

當(dāng)適格專利主題被視為一項(xiàng)法律上的問題，不適格專利主題加入額外權(quán)利要求要素的轉(zhuǎn)化則包含了事實(shí)問題。

在最高法院作出對(duì)Mayo案的裁決后，被告在專利訴訟中成功利用§ 101條款作為工具，通過辯稱權(quán)利要求只采用了易于理解、常規(guī)及傳統(tǒng)活動(dòng)，在早期撤銷動(dòng)議中依法律判決對(duì)專利進(jìn)行無效。這一趨勢使得相當(dāng)多的申請人對(duì)主題普遍涉及抽象概念或自然法則領(lǐng)域的申請減少遞交量。

然而近期幾項(xiàng)聯(lián)邦巡回法院的判決建議，除了Mayo的判決意見外還有其它的考慮因素，特別在解決對(duì)事實(shí)問題的爭議上，及通過使用§ 101進(jìn)行簡易判決動(dòng)議及撤銷動(dòng)議來無效權(quán)利要求。

在Berkheimer v HP, Inc.一案中，聯(lián)邦巡回法院認(rèn)為在簡易判決階段對(duì)涉案領(lǐng)域內(nèi)什么屬于易于理解的事實(shí)問題作出判決為時(shí)過早，因此并不合適。

接下一周，在Aatrix Software, Inc. v. Green Shades Software, Inc.中，聯(lián)邦巡回法院將這一推理延伸至此案的判決中，指出只在沒有事實(shí)指控的情況下§ 101才可用于撤銷動(dòng)議，依法律判決權(quán)利要求無效，反之則阻止解決專利適格性問題。

最后，在Exergen Corp. v. Kaz USA, Inc.一案中，對(duì)Exergen所宣稱的核心體溫計(jì)算裝置采用了關(guān)于體溫的自然法則并無爭議。這項(xiàng)案件中，在陪審團(tuán)裁定主張的權(quán)利要求被侵權(quán)及并非無效后，被告基于不適格專利主題遞交了無效權(quán)利要求的請求，地區(qū)法院駁回該請求。被告進(jìn)行上訴，聯(lián)邦巡回法院根據(jù)§ 101條款對(duì)專利適格性問題進(jìn)行了重新審查，采用“明顯錯(cuò)誤”原則（clear error standard, 為了推翻地區(qū)法院的事實(shí)認(rèn)定，上訴法院必須證明裁決存在“明顯錯(cuò)誤”。）復(fù)審了地區(qū)法院關(guān)于什么是常規(guī)、慣例及易于理解的事實(shí)認(rèn)定。

聯(lián)邦法院的結(jié)論是“盡管所主張的權(quán)利要求是基于自然現(xiàn)象，”該自然現(xiàn)象已轉(zhuǎn)換成“非侵入性及準(zhǔn)確測量人體體溫的創(chuàng)新方法及實(shí)用裝置”，因此涉案權(quán)利要求“并非傳統(tǒng)、常規(guī)或易于理解的?！?br/>

作為對(duì)該結(jié)論的支持，聯(lián)邦巡回法院依據(jù)基本的事實(shí)，指出“不能僅僅因?yàn)樵诂F(xiàn)有技術(shù)文獻(xiàn)中被披露，既認(rèn)為一些權(quán)利要求是易于理解、常規(guī)及傳統(tǒng)的?！狈ㄔ弘S后指出原告在對(duì)所宣稱發(fā)明進(jìn)行測試及研發(fā)中所投入的大量時(shí)間和資金。

傳統(tǒng)上由法律判決所主導(dǎo)的訴訟領(lǐng)域，近期的判決在對(duì)事實(shí)問題的關(guān)注上與日增長并在訴訟中呈現(xiàn)。

對(duì)于專利申請人來說，對(duì)權(quán)利要求的組合或轉(zhuǎn)化使其不太可能被認(rèn)為屬于傳統(tǒng)、常規(guī)、或易于理解進(jìn)行的預(yù)測及定義需求增加，以確保專利組合可以作為商業(yè)工具被準(zhǔn)備、維持或主張。

直至法院未來對(duì)什么可構(gòu)成超越“易于理解、常規(guī)及傳統(tǒng)活動(dòng)”的發(fā)明構(gòu)思加以闡明，建議專利申請人及訴訟律師應(yīng)密切關(guān)注案件爭議事項(xiàng)的事實(shí)。

附：英文全文

Recent Decisions In Favor Of Patent Eligibility Focus On Factual Inquiries

Patentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101 includes “anything under the sun that is made by man” with the implicit exception that laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas are not patentable.[1]Following the Supreme Court’s affirmance of the Federal Circuit’s holding in Alice[2], courts determine whether the nature of otherwise ineligible subject matter is transformed into a patent-eligible application by reciting additional elements in the claim.  The claimed subject matter is only patent-eligible if it adds an inventive concept beyond “well-understood, routine, conventional activity previously engaged in by researchers in the field.”[3]While subject matter eligibility is viewed as a matter of law, transformations of ineligible subject matter by additional claim elements involve questions of fact.

In the wake of the Supreme Court’s decision in Mayo, defendants in patent suits successfully utilized § 101 as a tool to invalidate patents as a matter of law on early motions to dismiss,by arguing that the claims employed only well-understood, routine, conventional activity. This trend has led some applicants to consider reducing the number of filings in subject matter areas where abstract ideas or laws of nature are common.

However, several recent Federal Circuit decisions have suggested there may be considerations beyond the holdings in Mayo, particularly to address disputes over questions of fact, and especially when motions for summary judgment or to dismiss use § 101 to invalidate claims.

In Berkheimer v HP, Inc.[4], the Federal Circuit held that it may be untimely and thus inappropriate at the summary judgment stage to resolve questions of fact about what was well-known by researchers in the field. The following week, in Aatrix Software, Inc. v. Green Shades Software, Inc.,[5] the Federal Circuit extended this line of reasoning to cases decided on the pleadings, noting that § 101 can be used in motions to dismiss to invalidate claims as a matter of law, only when there are no factual allegations that, taken as true, prevent resolving the patent eligibility question.

Finally, in Exergen Corp. v. Kaz USA, Inc.[6], there was no dispute that Exergen’s claimed core body temperature calculation device employed a law of nature about body temperature. In that case, after a jury found the asserted claims infringed and not invalid, the defendant moved for invalidity of the claims as ineligible subject matter, which the district court denied. The defendant appealed, and the Federal Circuit reviewed the issue of patent eligibility under § 101 de novo, applying the deferential “clear error” standard of review to the district court’s factual findings regarding what was routine, conventional, and well understood. The Federal Circuit concluded that “while the asserted claims are based in natural phenomena,”

the natural phenomena were transformed into “inventive methods and useful devices that noninvasively and accurately detect human body temperature,” and therefore were “not conventional, routine, or well understood.” In support of its conclusion, the Federal Circuit relied on underlying facts, noting that “[s]omething is not well-understood, routine, and conventional merely because it is disclosed in a prior art reference,”[7] and further highlighted the significant time and money invested in the testing and development of the claimed invention.[8]

In an area of litigation traditionally dominated by matters of law, recent decisions have focused on the growing importance of matters of fact and their presentation in patent lawsuits.  For patent applicants, there is an increasing need to anticipate and define combinations or transformations that will not likely be perceived as conventional, routine, or well understood, to ensure that patent portfolios can be prepared, maintained, or asserted as effective business tools.

Until the courts further clarify what constitutes an inventive concept beyond “well-understood, routine, conventional activity,” applicants and litigators alike are well advised to pay close attention to the facts of the matter in dispute.

注釋：

[1] Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980); Mayo v. Promethius, 566 U.S. 66, 70-71, (2012).

[2] Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank International, 573 U.S.      (2014). [3] Mayo v. Prometheus, 566 U.S. 66 (2012).

[4] Berkheimer v HP, Inc., No. 2017-1437 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 8, 2018).

[5] Aatrix Software, Inc. v. Green Shades Software, Inc., No. 2017-1452 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 14,2018).

[6] Exergen Corp. v. Kaz USA, Inc., No. 2016-2315 (Fed. Cir. March 8, 2018). [7] Id. at p. 10.

[8] Id. at p. 11.

發(fā)布：IPRdaily中文網(wǎng)（IPRdaily.cn）

作者：Jacob C. Bachman律師 及 Walter C. Frank律師

供稿：Brinks Gilson & Lione律師事務(wù)所

編輯：IPRdaily趙珍          校對(duì)：IPRdaily縱橫君

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